Raising venture capital gets celebrated as the win, but plenty of the damage happens in what founders do next. The chase to close a round can leave founders wary of their new investors, and once the money lands the instinct is often to solve problems quietly and only surface them once they're fixed, which is exactly when things spiral.
Across stages from day-one investing to growth-stage series A and B, this panel of investors trade war stories about the recurring mistakes: hiding problems instead of communicating, letting costs outrun revenue the moment a big cheque arrives, being too afraid to raise prices, stepping away from founder-led sales before the machine is built, and clinging to loyal early hires who can't take the company to its next phase. The throughline is trust and transparency, and treating your investor as the first call when something goes wrong rather than the last.
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So I don't know if you guys saw recently that Marc Andreessen, famous venture capitalist, said that he thought VCs would be one of the last jobs that AI would come for because of its artisanal nature. So no pressure. But I think he's he's trying to make a point, is there's stuff that Chachi Pitish is not gonna tell you, and it's probably the war stories, the real kind of anecdotes of when stuff has gone wrong and when stuff has gone wrong and then it's gone right and when
stuff has gone really, really well without any problems, which I'm not sure if those stories particularly exist. So the topic of the panel is what do founders get wrong after they've received venture capital money? So I think let's kick off and talk about a few kind of war stories of things that are top of mind for you guys when you're starting to kind of start that relationship with the founder, you're writing that check, you're starting to go in the journey with them.
Maybe, Will, we could start with you. What's top of mind for you? For for me, definitely the biggest issue or mistake founders make after taking VC investment is all around communication and not remembering that once we've invested, it's no longer this kind of over sales process and we should be on the same team.
And so what I often find as founders, they will hide or not tell you the problems and try and solve it instead of letting me know. You asked for examples, but the first one that comes to mind is we had invested pretty recently, not recently, but pretty soon after we invested in a Danish company.
What I was unaware of, even though I was attending board meetings on a bimonthly basis, was that there was a sexual harassment case happening in the company, and there was also a fraud case happening in the company. And both had occurred after I had invested.
I was attending board meetings, not being informed because the founders wanted to try and solve it and then tell me this happened, but we've solved it. But it ended up getting much, much worse. And by the time that we got to it, it ended up being a massive issue.
And so I think when it comes to learnings, just make sure you're communicating with your investors. They're on your side. Most of the time, they're on your side. And if you communicate what the problems are, almost definitely we can help them. And that's probably the biggest mistake I see.
That's one extreme example, but there's lots of smaller examples similar to that. I would yeah, I agree. And I think it's funny the thing you said about Marc Andreessen, because I think one of the things that will stand us apart is EQ. And I think EQ is somewhat related to building, being able to build trust and have kind of strong communication practices.
So at Antler, we invest on day one. So we invest before anyone else invests. So most of the founders some of them have been through the founder journey already, but a lot of them don't really understand what it is to raise money from a VC and what that relationship looks like.
But I also think, kind of speaking from the perspective of a founder, they speak to hundreds of VCs, or they should. And in that process, a decent amount of VCs will lie to them about the reason for passing. They'll ghost them. They'll probably look at their deck repeatedly on Doc's end and then not go back to them.
Competitor. They'll do some shady tactics, which is maybe part and parcel of the industry that we work in. But I think when lots of founders go into that VC relationship, their levels of distrust are super, super, super high. Like they think that VCs are somewhat charlatans.
They're out to get them. And I think even though they may be the wills and the ads that invest in them and have their best interest at heart and want to build those, the best relationships possible, I think founders are often acting from the perspective of, you're going to try and catch me out.
And I'm not sure about sharing that because I'm not sure what you're going do with that information. So I think actually it comes from even way before you make the investment, building that trust and making sure that they feel they can be open with you and that you actually just want to help.
And I think it's so important before you get to the point of an Ed where they're setting up the board, that you build that relationship from the get go. Yes. I'm Edward from Octopus Ventures. I look at companies which tend to be a bit further on.
So sort of growth stage series A, series B software companies. And so quite often, they've got management teams that are already structured. They might have sort of forty, fifty employees. So there's quite a lot going on in the company already when we come in.
I think the one problem happens, like, one of my old bosses said to me is basically, you agree a term sheet, and you build up all of this goodwill with the founders and all the rest of it, and then you spend the next two weeks in diligence or four weeks in diligence trying to maintain that relationship as best as you possibly can.
And that goodwill kind of sinks right to the point where you just about get the deal done, because when investors do a deal, they're obviously going do huge amounts of diligence, ask loads of really awkward questions, and try and get under the skin.
And that so it feels a little bit confrontational in the nature of doing a deal. Prior to VC, I did kind of profitable companies, so low and mid market buyout stuff. And my old mantra used to be like, you know, I'll sit on a board for six months, just kind of feel the company, get used to it.
And that's what I thought was my playbook. And then I got into VC. And I think it was like my second board with the first VC backed company that I'd got into, and they were already running out of money. I was like, ****, I thought I had six months to kind of sort this out and to like think about it.
And I had a case a few years ago, back in like twenty two, when you remember when money was really, really cheap, and it was like really easy, and every VC was a genius, because the SaaS multiples have gone up to twenty x.
And we'd invested in one company right at the height of that. So, like the worst possible timing, couldn't have been worse. And for one reason or another, the first three board meetings got cancelled. And by the third board, you know, by the first board meeting we went to, it transpired that revenues had gone kind of fairly flat to down, but costs had doubled.
And so I'd say the first thing that happens when a company gets sort of VC money is that all of a sudden you've got five million quid in your bank account, and things feel much, much easier. And now I can make all those hires that I never could make before.
But if you allow your cost line to sort of quickly outstrip your revenue line, and you don't let those things go together, then very quickly you end up in trouble. And for example, that company almost burned the entire five million investment within the first ten months.
Partly my fault for allowing the boards to slip, but also just because they just assumed by adding more and more people very quickly with our money that the revenue lines would follow. And that's what the head of sales was saying. So the first thing I do to you know, first thing I always say to a company after I've invested is do nothing.
Like, the first thing you should do is just pause a second, catch your breath, and don't get kind of blindsided by the big check that's now in your bank account. And don't lose that kind of scrappy culture maybe that you had that got you to that place in the first place.
And I think that's around alignment, right? So getting alignment also with your investors, what are the expectations? You are not expecting to turn that money in ten months, I'm assuming. And I think that's really important. As soon as you raise financing, you've been doing the sales process with your investors up until that point.
Once the money is in the bank, the contracts are signed, you need to make sure you sit down and get that alignment that you're both going towards the same place. One thing we've started to do or started doing companies is that this is a thing where you have the management business case, which was absolutely insane.
It was like a rocket ship. No company ever hits their management business case, just doesn't happen. So what we do is then build our investor business case, which was like the management business case, but slightly more prudent. But we never talked to the management teams about that investment case.
It was kind of our, like, don't worry, because even if they don't hit these high numbers, we'll be here. It's a complete waste of time, because the management are going to go off and do it do it their way anyway. So what I tend to do now is say, look, that's your management business case.
But for if for whatever reason, the revenues don't come through in the way that you think they will do, can we make can we agree now the steps that we're going to take? So let's not have an argument in six months' time about what's going happen.
Let's just not like to the nth detail, because who the hell knows what's going to happen, but at least kind of get on the same page that actually if the revenues don't go skyrocket in like your management case, that we've at least got a playbook that we can go to.
How much do you guys, Hannah and Will, are investing at an earlier stage have those set kind of reminders or plans that you're making with the founder once you invest? Well, I was going to say that sounds quite unusual for us. We invest when companies are about ten weeks old.
So the likelihood of them having revenues is quite low. So they can have their pipeline, they have their go to market strategy, they obviously have forecasted what they hope they will bring in over time. But it's really just keeping in touch and making sure that we are very clear with them about frequently communicating with us, sending out those updates.
And I think it's very hard, and you might disagree, like setting solid targets from that point, because it is still in many cases, obviously depending on what your business is, who your customers are, how long those sales cycles are. At the very early stages, like within between three to six months, can be a little bit finger in the air.
So what we say is actually please just be very transparent with us around your sales conversations, what's happening when, and revisit those projections over time. But when at our other fund, at Houghton Street Ventures, when companies are a little bit later and they may have a product and they may have revenues, we really get them to set targets.
And every month in their update, report on those targets because then we get a sense of where they're falling down. And actually that enables us to help them. And what you see in the companies that are slightly more fearful is that they obfuscate all of that or they bury the lead or they hide everything.
And then you have to kind of decipher and pick it apart and be like, well, what's happening where? And then you do an update call and it's still a bit of a mess. And I just think it goes back to that. I hate to be that boring one, like trust and communication.
But yeah, for slightly later stage, would say that targets are really important. But for earlier, it's just around frequency and transparency. So what's that inflection point? Maybe Will, you can jump in on that. Yes, I mean, we invest in a company, so as for context in the room, about eighty percent of our investments are seed stage, twenty percent are pre seed.
So most of our companies have an early product, maybe some early revenue. When we invest, we have an onboarding session and we have a whole kind of presentation we run them through, which is all about trying to set expectations and understanding and help them understand what that relationship should be like.
Do like to set the team to set targets, but it's less of a to your point, it's not hard targets because I think if you're not setting targets, because there's so many assumptions you make as a founding team, whether that's about customers or speed at which you can build a product or how much your team is going to grow.
I think it's about putting kind of a stake in the sand and saying this is what I think and then reviewing as to why that didn't happen and then you can learn, right? Why did we make assumptions that didn't pan out? And then so that next time you're making assumptions, we can learn from that and hopefully make better assumptions to be better at predicting the next time.
I think I mean, it comes down to resource allocation. If you don't have targets, how do you know where you're gonna put your resources? How do you know whether your next pounds in tech development or if it's gonna be in marketing or sales?
I know that, you know, a lot of founders will be like, oh, I hate buildings like, you know, forecasts or whatever. But it's like, but that's guiding you to your resource allocation. And when we give you, you know, we invest a check, it's like you're gonna have to choose where to put that money.
And know where you're gonna put it, then, you know, that's that becomes really problematic. And the one thing I would say, I think it's also, you know, this is about kind of what happens once you've taken VC money. But there is actually a stage before that, which is, you know, when I talk to my sort of founder friends, it might not be a not one for us to invest into, but I'm just trying to give advice.
I I always tell them, ask these questions like, is this VC the first person you'd call when things go wrong? Because ultimately, the best relationships I've always had with my founders is it's not it's it's like I really hit a nerve when you said that.
It's like sometimes CEOs really just wanna get all the problems solved and then tell you that is the worst thing you can do. So is the first call you're gonna make when you lose your biggest client, is it to your investor? And if or at least up there.
And if it's not, then you should probably go and try and find a different VC. What do you do to set the tone? Right? Because that's, you know, each of you are setting that setting out your stall in terms of that relationship with the founder.
How do you set the tone on both comms, also the level of trust? I was just going to add on to Edward's point quickly. We have a founder who has a background in PE, and I think that's left them with some serious trust issues.
And we've been invested in them coming up to two years. And how they treat us is as that person who they text when they're in trouble. And I'd say whilst it's lovely to be the first person that they want to talk to when they're in trouble, we only tend to hear the the trouble, like the I've got a legal issue or, you know, I'm gonna be sued or this has happened.
And and you're kind of like, please give us the context for everything else that's happening. So whilst you want to be that person that they come to in times of and actually have that really we always used to joke at our old firm, oh, we have this really great relationship because we have WhatsApp contacts.
And we just message people frequently on WhatsApp, we're so close to them. And now at Antler, we're working day in, day out with these businesses or founders for ten weeks. We suddenly realized what a close founder VC relationship looks like. And what we had before was a total farce.
And now, I guess at Antler, we can talk more about actually how we communicate to founders about building that VC founder relationship and get them in early in terms of what does it it's so simple as what does a good update email look like.
And it sounds really basic to be sitting up here saying, talking about a good structured update email, but actually knowing how to structure it, what to include, how often you send it, who you're sending it to. I think those really elementary things from day one are really key in setting up the long term kind of structures that will then feed into the board engagement.
I think it also just maybe a slightly separate point, it's maybe it's also easy for us to sit up on stage and say, we do this with our portfolio companies and that works really well. There are lots of investors who don't do things after they invest.
And so it's also on you as management teams to have those conversations at the beginning as well. It's not just the investors who bring it up, you guys also need to have the initiative to bring that up with your investors because there's a lot of investors I've been on boards with who have no structure and no specific plan to create transparency and conversation with their founders.
So I think it's also that you need to be prepared that your investor might not hopefully, to your point, you'll be able to find the one that you have that trust with and that relation works well, but you might also need to be the one who introduces that level of transparency and openness with the investor.
And also, you start setting the expectations with them. Yeah, I mean, it's very hard to give a list of bullet points of this is how you should kind of do it, because it's quite a human thing, ultimately. It's like, do you gel with that person?
Do you get on with that person? Have you you know, how much do they care about the foundation of your company and the idea that you've got, not just the kind of the output at the end that they might make. You know, it's just getting a feel that there's some form of I'm not saying you're be best friends, but there's a kind of a professional respect between you.
You know, I've had invested in one founder, and generally the first board meeting that I was at, he didn't say a word. He was like, it was a three hour board meeting that had really, really long board meetings before with fifty page decks and all this, and clearly he'd been absolutely bruised from existing investors that wanted to go through this this hard and fast format.
And he was just like, I'm just sat here trying to get through this. You could just tell. And afterwards, you know, just by sort of saying, right, let's go for a drink, let's go for a coffee, and saying, reduce this deck down to fifteen slides, get rid of half the people on your board, let's like, let's work to get, let's work together in order to be in this together.
So you're trying trying to build that camaraderie between you and the kind of the key founder and and maybe it's the CFO, maybe it's the ops director, whoever it might be, to show you on the same side. Yeah. I should jump off onward.
One interesting thing about that is that actually, if you get into a position where you don't have a great relationship with your investor, when you go to raise your next round, that's a great chance to fix that by being open to the new investor and saying, my board doesn't really work right now.
I'd like you to help me fix it. And when you're a new investor's coming in, it's really easy for that new investor to restructure the board. Very hard for you to do that in the middle of a round or just when it's not particularly working.
When we were talking about this topic beforehand, obviously one of the things that came up was this idea of communication between the founders and the VC. The other thing that came up in sort of dribs and drabs was this idea of the kind of step change.
So the strategy is changing post investment. It's, know, the the ambitions are sort of scaling with the capital that they've raised. What are some kind of practical things that you've seen around, Will, you mentioned pricing or hiring or some of the things that you kind of have to reorientate yourself towards this, you know, new big goal post investment?
Well, I think once once you raise investment and suddenly you're investing more in your product to your point of pricing, we very frequently see our companies not raising their prices because they're so worried that they're going to lose a lot of customers by raising their prices and I almost I can't think of example of any of my portfolio when they raise prices, Lawson, there's a good example, we had a company log entries many years ago that went to be acquired, but at one point they had about one thousand customers and
the founders didn't want to raise the price and after six months of really pushing, we convinced the founders to triple the prices. Now that sounds crazy, but they were charging pennies for very valuable, useful software for these companies. And the founders genuinely didn't sleep for the two days before this, they thought they were going to lose their entire customers, there would be a strike of their customers and they tripled the prices, email went out, one person asked a clarifying question out of a thousand customers, nothing else.
So I think a lot of the time as founders you can forget that you've been making all these improvements to your product and you can forget that you can actually increase the prices too. Small point, not as important as comms, but it is something we see a lot.
I think maybe slightly unrelated, but the example we have is around pricing. I think sometimes when people raise money, they think they I don't want to say they think they know it all, but they feel quite confident. I don't know if this is maybe this is some you know, not applies to everyone.
But I think we try and reiterate, just ask for help. Always ask for help. It's better to not ask for help. And one of our companies, not Antler, in our former fund, they're using Agenetic AI for account based marketing, which is probably an area that lots of people are tackling.
They've pivoted like three or four times. They now have a heavy focus on gifting. But because they've pivoted so many times, they've had to adjust their pricing. And they're kind of just they're quite young and experienced and they're running at it. They came to us and said, we have actually no idea what we're doing.
It was amazing. It was really refreshing. They were like, we just need to speak to people. We really want to speak to experts who've worked in different types of SaaS products and different models. Can you please introduce us to an array of people?
So we put them in touch with four kind of pricing experts or go to market experts who are now helping them. It's like really and they keep updating us, being like, well, is great. And he's used this example. And it's so nice to see, because they're almost taking on that learning journey and actually showing how it's been put into practice.
Yeah. I mean, practically, after you've taken investment at sort of Series A and B, especially when it comes down to people, which you spoke about, there's a really hard truth which companies and founders really struggle with, which is it's very likely that a lot of the people that have got you to, whatever it might be, two million, four million annual recurring revenues, are not gonna be the people that will now take you to your next phase.
And that might be people that have been like super loyal to you, like people that you absolutely love, that you kind of you've been in the trenches with for the last five years building your business. And all of a sudden, VC comes in and says, you know, your kind of ops person who's been doing a bit of HR, a bit of finance, you know, sometimes helps with the marketing team, goes to the conferences, you know, runs stands at Turing Fest, whatever.
You know, now we're gonna put in a professional CFO who actually has raised, you know, large series c rounds, or has done an IPO, or done a big exit. And you're kind of you're kind of Swiss army knife person that you've that's been super loyal and dedicated.
It's kind of like, oh, that was kind of my job to produce all the monthly accounts, or produce you know, do the fundraising. I think you've got a choice there as a founder, is you either those people either have to start to change their careers, or change their trajectories to become more specialized, whatever that might look like.
Or you have to recognize that for both of you, that's that maybe the time has come when that person is no longer right in the business. Because otherwise what you end up with is you're gonna start hiring people over and above. These people who feel, probably themselves feel like sort of founders in some way, or co founders or sub founders.
And all of a sudden you're gonna hire somebody above them. So what I would say is, I don't have a solution because it's very specific for each company and each individual. But just be super aware of that just before, like, are those people that are currently in your business going to be the ones leading it?
And do they know that? Do they recognize that? We have actually just on a practical example, one of our companies that went under, which is the first company that went under in our first fund, which is a really kind of sad moment. They were really inexperienced.
They were building a new business model in the retail sustainability space, software and bricks and mortar. And they had no experience, really. But they had like insane hustle and they were just like making crazy progress, brought on board great funds. We were like a tiny ticket.
They were going like gangbusters for two years. We were like, every time we spoke to an LP, were like, we are so excited about this company. It's going to change the world. And it turns out that he didn't have didn't bring in the right finance experience, didn't bring in the right operational experience, didn't bring in the right retail experience, and I hid all the problems from all of the investors.
And we got a call saying, I've had a head injury. I have to leave the business. And he was the sole founder, brought in fraction al CFO. He then became the CEO. And this story is just going to play out. It kind of and it turns out that all of the data he was sharing with us in Excel was all wrong.
But we would have no idea how to we've kind of done the whole retro and see what we would do differently. And I think what it came down to is that he was so scared to admit that he was in too deep. And he was so scared to admit that he didn't know what he was doing, that he was too far.
And we wish now, hindsight is a wonderful thing that we could go back and say to him, look, what do you know? Let's talk about this and let's break it apart and work with the co investor. And, yeah, it's a really sad thing, but that was like a really prime example for us to bring those conversations way earlier and also acknowledge internally what we didn't know, right?
There were so many unknowns that we'd kind of ignored and just assumed that the lead would deal with, but they didn't for whatever reason. But it was, yeah. People often wonder why VCs often give such a premium to second time founders over first time founders.
Second time founders make so much less people mistakes. First time founders make so many people mistakes. That's the biggest difference between the two. And it saves you such a headache. And that's one of the main reasons VCs put such a premium on second time founders.
Because as you were giving your example and you were speaking, I was running through my head and I don't think there's a single second time founder in our portfolio who made those that mistake specifically. And I can literally think of so many of our first time founders who struggled to move those people on or to make that decision.
Yeah. We have some time for Q and A, but I actually want to ask like what's what's the worst hire you've seen? It can be an anonymized example. I mean, I've I've I've blogged about it quite a lot around the the Traumatized. The sales founder merry-go-round.
So quite often what happens again at series a is you get your big check, the founders the founders walked through walls. They're like, the founder has used their black book three times over. They don't care about how many people they annoy, because it's their business and they love it, and they're gonna get sales at whatever cost.
And then they make the big raise, they're like, great news, I've got the former head VP of Oracle Belgium or something. They're gonna come in, and they're gonna do I've got nothing against Belgium. Or Oracle. But they're gonna come in, and they're gonna now run my, you know, growth stage b to b SaaS company with all their knowledge.
And that person the founder then steps back, and then and that person then comes in and is like, okay, well this is my playbook, and this is how I do it. Now I need to hire ten sales people, because that's how many I had in my old team.
And it is a disaster. It invariably goes completely wrong. So I think that if I could say anything, and this is quite generic, I can give examples with beers. Is that the founder steps away from the sales momentum too quickly, before the machine is set up and before they really understand it.
And I know that's kind of like the whole idea is you put the right people in and step away. But as a founder, it comes to sales, people do that too early, too quickly. Yeah. And there's something in that around stage appropriateness as well.
Yeah. I would say the worst hire you can make is a bad co founder. I mean, genuinely, the amount of nightmares, like when you have a problem with your co founder, it envelops your entire mind for weeks, months, when there is a founder breakup, it is a potentially terminal diagnosis for a company.
And it always, I've never seen it go well when there is a problem. It's never easy to manage a founder out. So just making sure that when you're bringing on a cofounder or you're joining somebody, that you two are complementary, that you work well together, that you have the right the same alignment and vision.
Can I just add very quickly? And the hanger on the third cofounder that doesn't seem to be a problem right now But has been best friends since the best friend. Yeah. Like that person that's kinda like helps with the market. Do not allow them in. You know, I know it's early stage.
I know it doesn't matter. But if you actually are successful, and you're now at five million ARR, and this person is just getting paid, it's you know, you've got to recognize it. Or at the very minimum, I mean, at least if you're gonna make the mistake of having the wrong co founder, make sure you have proper, proper founder vesting in place for everyone, right?
Because that at least means that it doesn't have to potentially kill the company. Well, seeing you guys have stolen my answers. That has stolen, yeah. I was going to put it to spin on its head and say the worst example is the solo founder who doesn't want to hire anyone at their level.
The solo founder who The micromanager. Yeah, who micromanagers can't delegate, manages like a slightly outsourced agency, flock of interns, you know, who can't really bring on board someone and actually share those responsibilities. That's my example. It's really easy to be successful at the pre seed or seed stage and be an intense micromanager.
Once the company starts to scale, you can't micromanage a team of thirty, forty, fifty people and you start to see the cracks and the thing starts falling apart. Yeah, and also you like one thing we haven't talked about is actually like taking care of yourself as a founder.
Like that's kind of important and in that scenario it doesn't really end well. Yeah. We have like two minutes so if there are questions. Answered everything. No. I can keep mine alive. Does anyone have a story? I'm just putting I'm sorry. I said I wouldn't do it.
Maybe I'll just add two other quick points that just does things to, mistakes. So one is not adjusting your salaries after you raise more money. A lot of the time founders again feel like they put a business plan, they don't want to put too ambitious a crazy big salary in their plan to the VC, but then they feel like, now I'm stuck on my thirty ks, forty ks salary.
And so I think readjusting your salary is a good thing. I don't want my founders to be financially uncomfortable as long as it's not something that's completely unreasonable. I think you'll be surprised how reasonable your VCs are at that. Hi, so I work in executive search and sometimes I'm brought in when the founder, when the second co founder is leaving and you know obviously it's like difficult to find someone to replace them for all the reasons that you've mentioned, but I think that the companies that do that well also have
like an exit strategy and something that the co founder can do to go on and add value, maybe get board seats in industry, but that's something that businesses aren't necessarily encouraged to do or to think about how you make that person still at value have something around the business that they can do.
How do you have that conversation with the primary founder? Because it's such an emotive time, it's almost like a divorce sometimes if it's gone badly. I mean, I would say that if when a founder, a co founder leaves, they need to leave, leave.
Like they don't hang around and add consulting advice because you know, I've had an example of that where they'd literally just stand at the back of the room because they were being a consultant and it just means that nobody can then move on.
You know, it might be harder and they might have huge amounts of knowledge, but it should be really limited. I'm afraid it is a bit of a sticking plastic. It's like if someone breaks up with you, but then you stay in the house and watch another new relationship.
Like, it's not great. You know, I wouldn't recommend this. This is such a depressing note. Can I just say well, so to kind of it on Should have done that by yourself? We end it o's? She's ended on high o's. So I would say, you know, expectations post investment.
A little bit of a tip is that I think I'd you know, the expectations on the VC, they're not gonna come into your business and and all of a sudden find you loads of new customers and transform it. But what can be useful to make board meetings more useful, is just every board meeting I say to the founders, what two things do you wanna get from this board meeting?
And put them up in lights. Let's say that these are the two things that I want to talk about or or two decisions that I've got to make that I could help with or two types of people I need to find. And if you get like two good things from every single board meeting, then that that's gonna be a real positive.
And it also focuses the board conversation away from just why is your gross margin gone down by two percent or whatever. Yeah. That's great. Thank you, Thank you. Thank you. Thanks, everybody. Thanks. Well, great ending.
